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This paper uses micro data from the Indonesian Census of Manufacturing to analyze the causal 
relationship between foreign ownership and plant productivity. To control for the possible 
endogeneity of the FDI decision, a difference-in-differences approach is combined with 
propensity score matching. An advantage of this method, which has not been previously applied 
in this context, is the ability to follow the timing of observed changes in productivity and other 
aspects of plant performance. The results suggest that foreign ownership leads to significant 
productivity improvements in the acquired plants. The improvements become visible in the 
acquisition year and continue in subsequent periods. After three years, the acquired plants 
outperform the control group in terms of productivity by 34 percentage points. The data also 
suggest that the rise in productivity  is a result of restructuring, as acquired plants increase 
investment outlays, employment and wages. Foreign ownership also appears to enhance the 
integration of plants into the global economy through increased exports and imports.  
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d  1 
1. Introduction 
The conventional wisdom suggests that multinational companies have an advantage over 
local firms, which allows them to offset the extra cost of operating in distant and unfamiliar 
markets. However, is the superior performance of foreign affiliates due to the intrinsic 
advantage of a ‘pushy’ foreign parent company, or are foreign investors simply good at 
picking the best performing local plants as acquisition targets (the ‘gifted kids’ in our 
metaphor)? Recently, the application of sophisticated econometric techniques to longitudinal 
micro data has cast some doubt on an intuitive positive answer to these questions, often 
taken for granted by economists and policymakers.
1 As Harris and Robinson (2003) remark, 
if foreign ownership  per se is not associated with a productivity advantage, “then it is 
difficult to see how FDI can have a positive impact on overall (..) productivity and thus 
growth” in the host country.  
 
This study analyzes the causal link between foreign ownership and plant performance in 
Indonesia. While to the best of our knowledge this question has not been examined in a 
developing country context,
2 there are several reasons to expect that the effect of foreign 
ownership will be particularly pronounced in the developing world. First, the difference in 
technological sophistication between foreign investors and plants they acquire is likely to be 
larger in developing countries than in industrialized economies. Second, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is widely considered to be a key mechanism of cross-border technology 
transfer.
3 The plausibility of this mechanism is supported by theoretical arguments stressing 
the importance of intangible assets, transfer of technology from h eadquarters to foreign 
affiliates (e.g., Markusen 1995) and the fact that most of the world’s R&D effort is 
undertaken by multinational companies. Additionally, recent theoretical work by Helpman et 
al. (2004) on heterogenous firms suggests that multinationals come from the upper part of 
the productivity distribution of firms in their country of origin.
4 Third, the evidence based on 
stock market data suggests that when firms from developed countries acquire firms in 
emerging markets, the stock market antici pates significant value creation and substantial 
gains for shareholders of both acquirer and target firms (Chari et al. 2004). 
                                                 
1 Harris and Robinson (2003) demonstrate that foreign investors acquire the best performing firms in the UK, but 
subsequently the acquired firms do not reap any benefits from foreign ownership. Using Italian data, Benfratello 
and Sembenelli (2002) provide evidence of a productivity advantage stemming from foreign ownership, but only 
in the case of subsidiaries of US multinationals. Conyon et al. (2002), however, find a 14 percent differential in 
labor productivity between foreign and domestically owned firms in the UK, which can be attributed to 
differences in ownership per se. Surveying the empirical literature, Barba Navaretti et al. (2004, Chapter 7.3) 
stress that much of the available empirical evidence “supports a statistical association between foreign ownership 
and productivity, but not a causal link.” They further report that in those studies where a more careful analysis of 
causality was conducted “differences in productivity between the two groups of firms are smaller than in earlier 
estimations and often insignificant.” 
2 Two notable exception are Djankov and Hoekman (2000) and Evenett and Voicu (2002). Both studies consider 
only publicly listed companies in the Czech Republic. 
3 There is a large literature focusing on knowledge spillovers from FDI. For a review of the literature on intra-
industry spillovers see Görg and Strobl (2001) and Saggi (2002), for evidence on inter-industry spillovers see 
Javorcik (2004).  
4 This prediction has found empirical support in the context of Germany (Arnold and Hussinger 2005a) and 
Ireland (Girma, Görg and Strobl 2004).   2 
 
Disentangling correlation and causality is not straightforward. If high productivity plants are 
chosen by foreign investors, the ownership status becomes endogenous and a simple least-
squares estimation invalid. This is why we use propensity score matching to assess the causal 
effect of foreign ownership on plant productivity. The matching technique creates the 
missing counterfactual of an acquired plant had it remained under domestic ownership. It 
does so by pairing up each plant that will receive FDI in the future with a domestic plant 
with very similar observable characteristics operating in the same sector and year. Propensity 
score matching is then combined with a difference-in-differences approach. The causal effect 
of foreign ownership is hence inferred from the average divergence in the productivity 
growth paths between each acquired plant and its matched control plant, starting from the 
pre-acquisition year. This strategy allows us to control for observable and unobservable but 
constant differences between the acquired and the control plants. While this approach has 
been widely used in labor economics it has not been applied to the estimation of host country 
effects of FDI. 
 
Employing this novel strategy has several advantages. First, unlike studies using the 
Heckman (1979) two-step procedure, we do not require a variable that influences the 
probability of receiving FDI but not the subsequent plant performance. Finding a suitable 
measure is frequently close to impossible. Second, in contrast to the GMM approach, our 
strategy does not require multiple lags of variables of interest and avoids questions about the 
appropriateness of lags as instruments. Besides, it is not dependent on the lack of the second-
order correlation in the data. Third, it allows us to follow the performance trajectory of FDI 
recipients rather than just estimating the average effect of receiving FDI. Finally, we are able 
to trace changes in other aspects of plant operations, such as investment, employment and 
exporting without having to model them explicitly.  
 
Our analysis, based on the plant-level data from the Census of Indonesian Manufacturing 
Plants covering the period 1983-96, shows that foreign ownership has a significant positive 
effect on plant performance measured in terms of total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is 
estimated at the level of 4 -digit sectors using the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) procedure to 
correct for simultaneity between productivity shocks and input choices. The estimated 
increase in plant productivity is quite large, reaching about 34 percent in the third year of 
foreign ownership. About half of the positive productivity effect is realized during the year 
foreign investment takes place with the rest occurring during the following two years. While 
this effect is larger than the 14 percent differential found in the UK by Conyon et al. (2002), 
it is smaller than the 43 percent advantage obtained for the Czech Republic by Evenett and 
Voicu (2003). As the productivity gap between domestic plants and multinational companies 
is most likely considerably larger in a developing country than in the UK, finding a bigger 
effect in a developing country context is not surprising.  
 
Several robustness checks are performed to assess the validity of the findings. First, we show 
that the results are robust to extending the time horizon under consideration to five years of   3 
foreign ownership. This exercise indicates that receiving FDI leads not only to an immediate 
boost to productivity but that the improvements continue to take place in subsequent periods. 
Second, to eliminate the possibility that pre-acquistion trends in productivity may be 
influencing our findings, we demonstrate that the results hold when matching takes into 
account the rate of productivity change in the period prior to acquisition. Third, our results 
are not affected when we relax the restriction of matching within the same sector and year. 
 
Additionally, we provide evidence indicating that productivity improvements take place 
simultaneously with increases in investment outlays, employment, wages and output, thus 
suggesting an on-going restructuring process. We also demonstrate that plants  receiving 
foreign investment become more integrated into the global economy by exporting a larger 
share of their output and sourcing a larger share of their inputs from abroad.  
 
Our results, pointing to profound changes taking place in FDI recipients, are consistent with 
anecdotal evidence. For instance, when the German company Caatoosee AG acquired an 
Indonesian software firm, Sigma, the employment in the acquired firm increased by 20 
percent within just twelve months.
5 Two years later, AlphaBITS, the software developed by 
Sigma received Merit Award for the best industrial application at the Asia Pacific ICT 
Award 2001. It was the first time ever Indonesia participated in the event attended by 
competitors from 11 countries.
6 Similarly, when H.J. Heinz purchased a majority stake in PT 
ABC Central Food Industry, maker of Indonesia’s hot chili sauce and the world’s second 
largest producer of soy sauce, it did so with an intention to transform the Indonesian plant 
into a launch pad for an ethnic foods business worldwide.
7 The steel industry provides an 
example of technology transfer from abroad to an Indonesian subsidiary. The Maspion 
Stainless Steel Indonesia, a joint venture between Indonesia’s PT Alumindo and Kanematsu 
Corp of Japan, is on the way to become the first stainless steel cold rolling mill in Indonesia 
to produce stainless steel coil and sheet of grades SUS 304 and 43 thanks to the technology 
provided by Sumitomo Metals of Japan under the technical assistance agreement.
8 
 
While we have confidence in our results, we also address the plausibility of alternative 
explanations that could be consistent with the observed pattern. First, we eliminate the 
possibility that the observed improvements are purely driven by a valuation effect by 
pointing out that the productivity improvement is not a level effect but a gradual process 
taking place over a longer period of time. Moreover, as there is no difference between the 
acquired plants and the control group in terms of royalty payments, our productivity results 
cannot be attributed exclusively to an introduction of new brand names. We also demonstrate 
that productivity improvements are present in plants that are not engaged in exporting, 
                                                 
5 http://www.hv-info.de/download/Caatoosee_02-03-31_GB.pdf   
6 http://www.sigma.co.id/history.asp  
7 Source: “U.S. Firms See Hope Amid Woe in Indonesia—A Hardy Few Brave Riots to Make Acquisitions; Ford, 
Citygroup Wade In” The Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1999, A16. 
8 Source: http://www.alumindo.com/subsidiary.html   4 
importing and do not make royalty payments, which suggests that our findings are not driven 
by accounting differences related to international transactions motivated by transfer pricing. 
 
Second, to address the concern that the benefit of foreign ownership might be limited to 
easing credit constraints, our matching procedure includes a binary variable indicating the 
use of bank loans. Furthermore, our conclusions do not change when  matching is performed 
using a Mahalanobis distance measure that includes the value of investment undertaken 
during  the year when foreign investment is  received, thus eliminating differences in 
contemporaneous investment between the treatment and the control group.  
 
Third, our findings are unlikely to be due solely to scale economies. The production 
functions estimated at the sectoral level indicate that in 77 percent of sectors constant returns 
to scale cannot be rejected. We also show that foreign ownership is not associated with an 
increase in capacity utilization. Fourth, we demonstrate that our results cannot be explained 
by improvements undertaken in preparation for entering foreign markets, as they hold even 
for the subsample of non-exporting plants. 
 
Fifth, to support our conclusion that it is foreign ownership per se rather than mergers and 
acquisitions in general that leads to an improved performance, we use propensity score 
matching combined with a difference-in-differences approach to compare productivity 
outcomes for privatizations into domestic and foreign hands. We show that transfer of public 
ownership to foreign investors is associated with greater productivity improvements than 
domestic privatizations. Additionally, we utilize data on several domestic acquisitions from 
the Securities Data Corporation Mergers and Acquisitions Database to show that in contrast 
to foreign acquisitions, domestic M&As are not associated with an increase in cost 
efficiency. 
Finally, by confirming our findings using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) we 
eliminate the possibility that our choice of econometric strategy is crucial to our findings. 
 
To summarize, while there is some indication that better performers become FDI recipients, 
foreign ownership per se is found to lead to an improved performance of acquired plants. 
Thus we conclude that FDI has a positive direct effect on the productivity of recipient plants 
in the host country. This finding confirms an implicit assumption made in the literature on 
FDI spillovers and indicates that FDI indeed presents a potential for knowledge transfer 
through spillover effects. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the existing 
literature. Section 3 outlines our empirical strategy for identifying the causal relationship. 
Section 4 describes the Indonesian Census of Manufacturing. Section 5 provides evidence 
suggesting that plants receiving FDI exhibit superior performance several years before the 
change in ownership takes place. Section 6 explains the details of propensity score matching 
and the difference-in-differences technique used. Section 7 presents the results of this 
analysis, while Section 8 focuses on robustness checks. The last section concludes.    5 
 
 
2. Existing Literature 
Multinational companies compensate for disadvantages of operating in foreign and 
unfamiliar markets through their large endowments of intangible assets, such as, superior 
technologies, patents, trade secrets, know-how, brand names, management techniques and 
marketing strategies (Dunning 1993). Indeed the existing empirical literature has shown that 
firms undertaking FDI are characterized by high levels of R&D relative to sales, a large 
share of professional and technical workers in total employment, new and/or technically 
complex products and high levels of product differentiation and advertising (Markusen 
1995). It has also been demonstrated that multinational companies tend to invest more in 
labor training than local firms in host countries.
9 A significant portion of outlays on 
employee training is associated with technology transfer from the parent company to its 
foreign subsidiaries. It is not uncommon for staff from headquarters to conduct training in 
subsidiaries or for subsidiary staff to be trained at headquarters.
10 The combination of large 
endowment of intangible assets and high investment in staff training suggests that a change 
from domestic to foreign ownership is likely to lead to improvements in the plant’s 
operations through better production technologies and management techniques.  
 
Performance comparisons between foreign and domestic plants face a number of 
econometric challenges. First, plants acquired by foreign investors are unlikely to be a 
random sample from the population. To the extent that the acquisition targets differ 
systematically from other plants, a problem of simultaneity between ownership status and 
other performance-relevant variables will arise and bias the estimate of the productivity 
advantage. Second, partial measures of productivity (such as output per worker) cannot 
provide a reliable picture because of possible systematic differences in production 
technologies.
11 Third, the measurement of total factor productivity itself is prone to errors. 
As plants choose their factor compositions, they may take into account productivity shocks 
that are unobservable in the data. If productivity and inputs are determined simultaneously, 
as is most likely the case, the results of least squares productivity estimations are biased. 
 
The related literature can be classified according to the extent to which it takes into account 
the three problems mentioned above. A number of studies restrict their attention to 
                                                 
9 For instance, according to the survey described by Kertesi and Köllö (2001), foreign-owned firms in Hungary 
spent 14.2 percent of their investment on training, as compared to 2.4 percent in the case of domestic firms. 
Similarly, Filer et al. (1995) found that in foreign-owned firms in the Czech Republic spent 4.6 times more than 
domestic firms on hiring and training. A recent study focusing on Malaysia also showed that foreign-owned firms 
provide more training to their workers than domestic enterprises (World Bank 1997). 
10 Ramachandaram (1993) shows that as a result of a licensing agreement for technology transfer to a subsidiary, 
foreign parent companies sent on average 2.46 employees from the headquarters to their fully-owned subsidiaries 
in India and 1.91 subsidiary employees visited the headquarters for training. For partially-owned foreign projects, 
the corresponding figures were 0.65 and 0.61.  
11 Griffith and Simpson (2001) provide evidence that foreign firms in the UK use production technologies that are 
consistently more intensive in capital and skills than those used by domestic firms.    6 
measuring labor productivity using value added per worker. Evidence of a positive 
correlation of this measure with foreign ownership has been presented by Haddad and 
Harrison (1993) for Morocco, Griffith and Simpson (2001) for the UK and Girma et al. 
(2004) for Ireland. Total factor productivity has been compared against the nationality of 
ownership by Aitken and Harrison (1999) in Venezuela, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) and 
Evenett and Voicu (2003) in the Czech Republic, Doms and Jensen (1998) in the United 
States, Griffith (1999) and Harris (2002) in the British car industry and by Benfratello and 
Sembenelli (2002) in Italy. These studies find a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and TFP, but the magnitude of the difference between domestic and foreign 
establishments tends to be much smaller than the effects on partial productivity measures in 
other studies. The latter three papers control for the endogeneity of input choice by 
instrumenting explanatory variables with their lagged  values, using a GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) also exploit this 
estimator to control for the endogeneity of ownership by taking into account changes in 
ownership within plants. Evenett and Voicu (2003) correct for the selection bias using 
Heckman’s two-step model and correct for the simultaneity between input choice and 
productivity using the Olley-Pakes (1996) procedure. Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) and 
Evenett and Voicu (2003) are the only studies addressing all three empirical problems 
outlined above. The former study finds that foreign ownership has no effect on productivity, 
while the latter documents a positive relationship.
12 The divergence of methods and results 
suggests that the empirical specification may strongly influence the conclusions on whether 
or not foreign ownership per se is associated with productivity advantages. 
 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
The first part of our strategy to address the endogeneity of ownership status is to focus on 
changes from domestic to foreign ownership taking place within the same plant. Naturally, 
this approach implies a substantial reduction of the number of plants considered. However, a 
nice feature of our data is that the sample size is large enough that we are still left with a 
sufficient number of observations to generalize our results with confidence. The advantage 
of focusing on plants observed before and after an ownership change is that through a 
difference-in-differences approach we can control for all n on-random elements of the 
acquisition decision that are constant or strongly persistent over time.  
 
Using a difference-in-differences technique allows us to compare the performance of 
acquired plants with the performance of plants remaining in domestic hands. This 
comparison, however, is still vulnerable to problems of non-random sample selection. To 
                                                 
12 Conyon et al. (2002) consider foreign acquisitions in the UK and employ the GMM estimator to correct for the 
selection of acquisition targets. However, as their variable of interest is value added per worker, they do not 
address the simultaneity of input choice. Their results suggest that foreign ownership improves productivity, but 
it is not significant in all specifications except for subsidiaries of US multinationals.  Girma and Görg (2003) also 
look at foreign acquisitions and find mixed effects on TFP depending on the sector they analyze, but they use a 
measure of TFP that does not take into account the simultaneity problem of input choices.   7 
address the selection issue, we combine a difference-in-differences approach with propensity 
score matching.
13 The matching procedure controls for the selection bias by restricting the 
comparison to differences within carefully selected pairs of plants. Each pair consists of an 
acquired plant and a domestic plant with similar observable characteristics in the year 
preceding the acquisition of the former.  
 
The aim of the analysis is to estimate the causal effect of foreign ownership on total factor 
productivity growth, defined as  
 
( ) ( ) ( )  | Y E -   | Y E     | Y - Y E 1 FDI 0 1 FDI 1 1 FDI 0 1 = = = =             (1) 
 
which is the difference between the performance paths of plants that changed ownership 
(first term) and the analogous outcome of the same plants had they not been acquired by 
foreign investors (second term).
14 The latter outcome is, however, an unobserved 
counterfactual. The matching technique is a way of constructing this missing counterfactual 
by drawing comparisons conditional on a vector X of observable plant characteristics. The 
underlying assumption for the validity of the procedure is that conditional on the observable 
characteristics that are relevant for the acquisition decision, the treated (FDI recipients) and 
non-treated plants (those remaining in domestic hands) would exhibit a similar performance 
under the same circumstances:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )  ) | E(Y - ) | E(Y - ) | E(Y - )   | E(Y   | Y - Y E X   , 0 FDI 0 X   1, FDI 0 X   , 0 FDI 0 X   1, FDI 1 X   1, FDI 0 1 = = = = = =   (2) 
 
The second difference in equation 2 is the selection bias, which is assumed to be zero 
conditional on X. It represents the difference between the outcome of the acquired plants, 
under the hypothetical circumstances that they had they not been acquired, and those plants 
that remained in domestic hands, in the same (and this time true) situation of no ownership 
change. If the selection bias represented by the second term is zero for given realizations of 
the vector X, then we are left with only the causal effect. In other words, the performance 
difference between acquired plants and the carefully selected group of control observations 
is a consistent estimate of the causal effect under the matching assumption. Hence, if our 
matching process is successful, we can give a causal interpretation to the average 
performance difference between treatment and control plants.  
 
                                                 
13  Apart from its original applications in labor economics, the matching estimator has become increasingly 
popular in causal analyses in other areas of economics. Girma et al. (2004) and Arnold and Hussinger (2005b) 
apply this technique to examine the relationship between firm productivity and exporting. Barba Navaretti and 
Castellani (2004) also use this technique to examine the impact of outward FDI on home performance for a 
sample of Italian firms.  
14 Our notation is to be read as follows: The outcome variable Y represents productivity growth across the 
ownership change of the acquired (treatment) plants. Its subscript describes the (potentially hypothetical) 
circumstances under which an outcome is observed, while FDI=1 indicates reference to the group of firms that 
have been acquired in reality, i.e. our treatment group. Similarly, FDI=0 refers to control observations.    8 
Conditioning on a vector of variables is difficult, since it requires weighting differences in 
one dimension against another. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) provide a proof that 
conditioning on the propensity score is equivalent to conditioning on all variables in the 
treatment model. The propensity score is the predicted probability of treatment, which in our 
case is the probability of a plant receiving FDI. Making use of this result, we employ 
propensity score matching and compare the p erformance of plants within the pairs of 
observations matched on the propensity score. We also make sure that the matched control 
observations are assigned only from the same year and the same sector as the acquired plant. 
This eliminates the possibility that productivity differences across sector/year combinations 
exert influence on our estimated effects and shifts the focus of attention on the position of 
each plant with respect to the performance of others in the same sector and year.  
 
The combination o f matching and a difference-in-differences approach means that we look 
for divergence in the paths of performance between the acquired plants and the matched 
control plants that had similar characteristics in the pre-acquisition year. The performance 
analysis begins in the pre-acquisition period and focuses on the (cumulative) change in 
performance over the following year and then each of the subsequent two periods. Blundell 
and Costa Dias (2000) emphasize the benefits of combining matching and a difference-in-
differences approach for controlling for observable and unobservable but constant 
differences between treatment and control units. While matching accounts for differences in 
observable characteristics, its combination with difference-in-differences analysis provides 
“scope for an unobserved determinant of participation as long as it can be represented by 
separable individual - and/or time-specific components of the error term.” Examples of such 
determinants include a particular plant being chosen as an acquisition target because of the 
qualities of its manager or a foreign investor’s preference for a plant possessing particular 
tangible assets (e.g., a distribution network) or intangible assets (an established brand name).  
 
As the performance measure, we employ total factor productivity, defined as the residual of 
a Cobb-Douglas production function. We address the simultaneity problem in input choices 
by applying a semi-parametric estimator proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) with 
intermediate input u se serving as a proxy for productivity shocks. More specifically, we 
utilize information the amount of electricity consumed by each plant. As electricity cannot 
be stored, its consumption is likely to follow changes in production activity more closely 




Indonesia is a suitable choice for studying the effects of FDI. The country’s industrial 
success is a relatively recent phenomenon, and there have been significant inflows of foreign 
direct investment in the last two decades. In terms of GDP, the importance of foreign direct 
investment inflows has been rising steadily and significantly from the mid-1980s onwards, as   9 
can be seen from Figure A1. For the period 1990-1996, the country was the fifth largest 
developing country recipient of FDI (IFC 1997, p.17).  
 
Historically, the Indonesian manufacturing sector (excluding oil-related activities) has been 
of almost negligible importance until the 1970s, accounting for less than 10 percent of GDP 
in 1974-76. Only in the 1980s did the country begin to emerge as a significant industrial 
power. The attitude towards foreign direct investment has been generally welcoming since 
the late 1960s. However, as economic policy began to reduce trade barriers and deregulate 
industry in the early 1980s, Indonesia received a new surge in FDI inflows that tended to be 
geared towards efficient and internationally competitive activities, mainly in the 
manufacturing sector (Hill, 2000, p.76). This coincides with the beginning of our data 
window. 
 
The data used in this paper come from the “Survei Manufaktur,” the Indonesian Census of 
Manufacturing, which has been conducted by the National Statistical Office (BPS) on annual 
basis since 1975. The census surveys all registered manufacturing plants with more than 20 
employees.
15 It contains detailed information on a large number of variables pertaining to 
input and output flows. There is some variation on the availability of variables from year to 
year, and the information of interest to us is available from as early as 1983. As the last year 
of our sample, we include 1996 in order to avoid capturing the effects of the Asian financial 
crisis, which strongly affected Indonesia beginning in 1997. In particular, we are concerned 
about a decline in the data quality due to the crisis and about a change in the motivation for 
foreign acquisitions in times when many Indonesian plants found themselves in financial 
distress. Our sample, covering the period 1983 -1996, contains more than 210,000 plant 
observations, of which about 5 percent belong to foreign-owned plants. The average spell a 
plant remains in our sample is between 8 and 9 years.
16  
  
In order to estimate the production function, we make use of the information on output (net 
of energy costs) and four factors of production: the number of production and non-
production workers, materials and capital. The capital stock variable has been newly 
constructed using the perpetual inventory method, making use of detailed data on investment 
in land, buildings, machinery, vehicles and other fixed assets.
17 To each investment data 
                                                 
15 Since regional statistical offices in Indonesia have financial incentives to obtain the relevant information from 
all active firms, we can be reasonably confident that the entire manufacturing sector above the 20 employee 
threshold is included in our sample. The survey questionnaires can be accessed online at 
http://www.rand.org/labor/bps.data/webdocs/statistik_industri/si_main.htm. 
16 The data have been cleaned conservatively for obvious keypunch errors. Particularly for the share of foreign 
ownership, we replaced outlier values with adjacent values whenever there was a drop to zero followed by a 
return to the previous value (e.g. 58, 58, 0, 58), or a different position of the decimal point followed by a return to 
the previous value (as in 60, 6, 60, 60) .  
17 We used the earliest available information on self-reported replacement values of each capital category as an 
anchor for the perpetual inventory method. Where a plant did not report the replacement values of its assets, we 
used the self-reported book values instead. Plants that never report capital stocks were dropped from our sample. 
Since the investment question was not asked in 1996, we had to use linear interpolation on the basis of  real 
investment figures in the two surrounding years for that year.    10 




Since the data contain no information on physical quantities of inputs used or output 
produced by plants, we are forced to start with nominal values instead. These are deflated 
using a set of 192 wholesale price indices for manufactured commodities, published by the 
Indonesian Statistical Office. The commodity indices are mapped to the 5 -digit ISIC 
classification using a concordance table provided by the Statistical Office. These detailed 5-
digit ISIC level deflators are applied to plant output and material inputs. Figures on 
investment and capital are deflated as follows. For buildings, we use a wholesale price index 
(WPI) published in the Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia, and for machinery and vehicles the 
average of the WPIs for 5-digit sectors producing machinery and vehicles, respectively. For 
other assets, we employ the economy-wide WPI. Unfortunately,  the Indonesian Statistical 
Office does not publish a wholesale price index for energy, so we were constrained to use a 
CPI specific to energy instead.  
 
The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas and is estimated using the 
semiparametric procedure suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
19 As a proxy for 
unobserved productivity shocks that may influence the input decision of the plant, we 
employ the amount of electricity consumed by each plant. The data contain information on 
electricity consumption net of own production and sales to other plants, expressed in 
physical quantities (kWh) which rules out measurement errors related to deflation. Our 
productivity measure is the residual of the production function in logarithmic form. We 
allow the coefficient estimates to differ over 62 manufacturing sectors, which is equivalent 
to the 4-digit ISIC level.
20 Given a substantial number of missing values in our data set, we 
are able to estimate TFP for about 120,000 plant observations. To avoid capturing effects 
caused by a change in principal activity of the plant, our matching analysis focuses only on 
plants that do not switch their sector of operation.
21 
 
We perform our analysis on 185 plants that switched from domestic to foreign ownership 
and remain in the data sufficiently long to be observed in the year before the acquisition, the 
                                                 
18 The assumed annual depreciation rate for buildings is 3.3 percent, for machinery 10 percent, and for vehicles 
and other fixed assets 20 percent. For land, we assumed no depreciation. These rates are very similar to estimates 
presented in Goeltom (1995). 
19 The estimation was implemented in Stata 8 using the program described in Levinsohn et al. (2003). In 29 out of 
62 industries this procedure moved the coefficient on capital in the expected upward direction when compared to 
a fixed effects estimation of the production function. This makes us feel confident that the correction is 
performing sufficiently well.  
20 The industry breakdown was adjusted to eliminate inconsistencies caused by the fact that BPS had removed 
several sectors and introduced a few others into the classification during the period of interest. In such cases, 
plants were regrouped into the corresponding ISIC Rev. 2 industries. Two petroleum sectors (ISIC 3530 and 
3540) were dropped from the sample because of a very small number of observations. ISIC sectors 3901-3909 
(Manufacturing industries not elsewhere classified) were also dropped due to concerns about plant heterogeneity 
within these sectors.  
21 Recall the we assign matches within the same sector and year to assure comparability. Considering plants that 
switch from one sector to another would make it impossible to maintain this matching restriction.    11 
acquisition period and two subsequent years.
22 This is a considerable number, considering 
that Conyon et al. (2000) find only 129 cases of foreign acquisitions with enough non-
missing data to make them suitable for their analysis. Their study analyzes a large developed 
country (the UK) and covers almost the same time period (1987-96). In a UK data set 
covering the period from 1980 to 1994, Girma and Görg (2003) are able to identify only 266 
foreign acquisitions. Figures A3 and A4 show the distribution of acquired plants in our data 
across years and sectors, respectively. Ownership changes occur in each 2-digit sector and in 




5. Evidence of the Selection Bias 
Our empirical strategy is driven by our concern about the selection bias that may result from 
better performing plants being acquired by foreign investors. To examine whether this 
concern is justified, we regress total factor productivity on a dummy for plants with foreign 
ownership in year t and a dummy for future acquisition targets during the three years prior to 
the ownership change.
24 The model also includes industry, region and year fixed effects. We 
exclude plants with foreign ownership throughout the period.   
 
The estimation results, presented in Table 1, demonstrate that future acquisition targets of 
foreign investors outperform other Indonesian plants during the three years preceding the 
ownership change. Not surprisingly, we also find that plants with foreign ownership exhibit a 
higher productivity than domestic plants. The magnitude of the effect is equal to 19.5 percent 
for future acquisition targets and 39 percent for plants with foreign ownership.  
 
We interpret this finding as indicating that foreign investors acquire domestic plants with an 
above average performance, a pattern sometimes called “cherry picking” in the literature. 
The evidence is strong enough to make a strategy of simply ignoring the issue imprudent. 
Therefore, in our analysis of the causal effect of foreign ownership on the plant performance, 
we will control for the selection bias. At the same time, the productivity premium exhibited 
by plants under foreign ownership is more than twice as large as the premium exhibited 
before receiving FDI, suggesting that foreign ownership may also have a positive effect on 
plant performance. In the next section, we analyze this relationship in more detail. 
 
Table 1.  Evidence of the Selection Bias 
 
Dependent Variable is Log TFP  Premium 
                                                 
22 We consider all plants with a foreign capital share above 20 percent as foreign owned. In practice, however, the 
exact value of this threshold does not matter because in more than 95 percent of acquisition cases the foreign 
capital share increased from 0 to 25 or more percent. Figure A2 depicts the distribution of foreign ownership 
share in the year following the entry of a foreign investor.  
23 Note that we do not consider changes in ownership taking place after 1994 as we want to observe each plant for 
at least two years after such a change has taken place. 
24 For example, in the case of a firm that receives FDI in 1993, the dummy would take on the value of one for 
1990, 1991 and 1992 and zero for all other years.   12 
Plant will receive FDI within next 3 years  0.178 *** 
(0.022) 
Foreign Ownership  0.331*** 
(0.009) 
No. of observations  111,707 
The regression includes industry, year and region fixed effects.  
Plants under foreign ownership throughout the period are excluded from the sample.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
6. Controlling for the Sample Selection Using the Matching Technique 
In order to make a meaningful comparison between the performance of Indonesian plants 
acquired by foreign investors and those remaining in domestic hands, we need to create a 
missing counterfactual capturing the performance of the acquired plants had they not 
received FDI. We do so by applying a matching technique to identify a suitable plant under 
continued domestic ownership to which we can compare each acquired plant. The 
requirement for a suitable control observation is sufficient similarity to the future acquisition 
target with respect to key determinants of the acquisition decision, so as to make these two 
plants a priori equally probable targets of a potential foreign acquisition.   
 
For obvious reasons, the control group is created on basis of observable plant characteristics. 
We believe that this is a good starting point as potential foreign investors rely heavily on 
basic observable characteristics of plants, such as their age, size, employment composition, 
machinery and equipment available, productivity, etc. to narrow down the number of 
potential acquisition targets. They may also judge suitability of plants based on their reliance 
on imported inputs which may indicate the sophistication level of the technology used. 
Finally, the fact that an establishment has received a bank loan may also contain information 
on financial institutions’ perceptions about trustworthiness and future prospects of an 
establishment. All of these factors are taken into account when constructing the control 
group. 
 
We use one-to-one nearest neighbor matching on the propensity score, which expresses the 
estimated probability of a plant becoming acquired by a foreign investor.
25 As mentioned in 
Section 3, this solves the dimensionality problem when considering differences on more than 
one observable characteristic. Moreover, we impose the additional requirement that the 
matched plant observations come from the same sector and year.
26 Therefore, in a first step, 
we use a probit regression to model the binary outcome of a plant becoming acquired by 
                                                 
25 We also tried other matching methods, such as kernel matching and caliper matching, and the results were 
qualitatively similar.   
26 Our matching procedure is implemented in Stata 8 using a modified version of the procedure described in 
Leuven and Sianesi (2001). The modifications were necessary to make sure that matched pairs come from the 
same year and sector.    13 
foreigners on the basis of plant-specific characteristics. To avoid endogeneity, all 
explanatory variables (except for age) are lagged one year.
 27 
 
The results from the probit regression, presented in Table 2, indicate that plants acquired by 
foreign investors differ systematically from other domestic plants. The model suggests that 
younger and larger (in terms of employment) plants are more likely to become acquired. The 
model allows for nonlinear effects of these two variables which indeed appear to be 
statistically significant. Further, the data show that plants with higher capital-labor ratio, 
plants engaged in sourcing inputs from abroad and plants with a higher fraction of white-
collar employees tend to be more attractive to foreign investors. As the goal of the study is to 
examine improvements in productivity due to the change in ownership, the model includes 
controls for the TFP level (normalized by the average TFP observed in the same industry and 
year) in the period prior to receiving FDI. This variable does not appear to be statistically 
significant, which is most likely due to a high correlation with other controls. Recall, 
however, that the results presented in the previous section suggest that the acquired plants 
exhibit superior performance already three years before the acquisition.  
 
To eliminate the possibility that improvements observed after the ownership change may be 
due to investments undertaken by plants prior to or in preparation for a foreign acquisition, 
the matching procedure controls for investment outlays lagged one period. This variable, 
however, does not appear to be statistically significant. To attenuate the possibility that the 
effect of FDI works purely through easing access to credit, the probit model also includes a 
dummy for plants having a bank loan but again the coefficient does not reach conventional 
significance levels. Finally, the model includes a dummy for plants with public ownership 
and a time trend, neither of which are statistically significant. 
 
To assess how well the propensity score matching performs in our case, we calculate the 
difference between the treated and the control group in terms of each of the above variables 
and run simple t-tests on the differences within 8 bands of the propensity score. This test is 
called the balancing hypothesis, and it can be performed using the procedure suggested by 
Becker and Ichino (2002). All of the differences are found to be small and statistically 




                                                 
27 In order to increase the precision of our model, we dropped all combinations of sectors, years and regions 
where no foreign acquisitions occurred. Not making this adjustment would increase the number of observations in 
Table 2 to 57,607 but would not change the conclusions of the paper.  
28 In our matching procedure we also exclude observations outside the common support. The common support is 
bound by the lowest propensity score of a treatment observation and the highest propensity score of a control 
observation.    14 
Table 2. Probit results   
Dependent Variable: Foreign acquisition   
ln Employment  0.813*** 
(0.246) 
ln Employment
2  -0.069*** 
(0.023) 
Age  -0.051*** 
(0.008) 
Age
2  0.0006*** 
(0.0001) 
ln Capital intensity  0.084*** 
(0.201) 
Share of imported inputs  0.650*** 
(0.102) 
Ratio of non-production workers  1.170*** 
(0.243) 
ln Relative TFP   0.059 
(0.076) 
ln Investment  -0.003 
(0.010) 
Bank loan dummy  0.0003 
(0.0003) 
Public ownership dummy  0.110 
(0.157) 
Time trend  0.026 
(0.016) 
Intercept  -4.042*** 
(0.645) 
No. of obs.  2,355 
Chi
2  186.01 
Prob > Chi
2  0.00 
Pseudo R
2  0.11 
All explanatory variables with the exception of age and age
2 are lagged 
one year. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively 
 
The predicted probabilities are used to assign to each future acquisition target a domestic 
plant that has the closest propensity score within the same year and sector. Thanks to a large 
number of available control observations in our data, the matching procedure produces an 
average distance in propensity scores within matched pairs of less than 4 percent, with a 
standard variation of approximately 5 percent. This convinces us that our matching 
procedure has managed to find appropriate comparison observations for each acquired plant.  
 
 
7. Results from the Difference-in-Differences Analysis on the Matched Sample 
(a) Baseline results 
The primary result of interest is the average difference in TFP in the matched pairs, net of 
the average initial difference before the acquisition. As can be seen  in Table 3, between the 
year prior to the acquisition, in which the matches are assigned, and the acquisition year, the 
treatment and control observations diverge significantly in terms of productivity. A foreign 
acquisition leads to an additional 15-percentage-point productivity boost in the acquired 
plants, which is not shared by similar plants remaining in domestic hands. In the subsequent 
years, the divergence in performance becomes even greater. By the end of the third year of 
foreign ownership, the acquired plants enjoy a productivity advantage over the control group   15 
equivalent to 34 percentage points. The results are significant at the five percent level in the 
acquisition year and at the one percent level in the following two years. 
 
Table 3. Matching Results for Productivity 










(c)   0.293
*** 
(0.074) 
n  185 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
n = number of matched acquisitions
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 




year n  acquisitio - pre  
treated
year n  acquisitio - pre   1
control
year n  acquisitio  
treated
year n  acquisitio   TFP ln  - TFP ln 
1
TFP ln  - TFP ln 
1  





year n  acquisitio - pre  
treated
year n  acquisitio - pre   1
control
1 year n  acquisitio  
treated
1 year n  acquisitio   TFP ln  - TFP ln 
1
TFP ln  - TFP ln 
1  





year n  acquisitio - pre  
treated
year n  acquisitio - pre   1
control
2 year n  acquisitio  
treated
2 year n  acquisitio   TFP ln  - TFP ln 
1
TFP ln  - TFP ln 
1   
 
These  figures are quite compelling. Performance improvements resulting from foreign 
acquisitions are likely to be larger in developing countries where the productivity gap 
between domestic plants and multinational companies is considerably greater. Thus, our 
result of a 34 percentage-point productivity advantage over a three-year horizon seems 
plausible when compared to the 14 percent improvement found by Conyon et al. (2002) in 
the UK. It is also smaller than the 43 percent improvement found by Evenett and Voicu 
(2003) in the Czech Republic. 
 
(b) Extending the time horizon 
To confirm that the observed productivity improvement is not a temporary phenomenon, we 
extend the time horizon to cover two more years after the acquisition. The difference-in-
differences results presented in Table 4 indicate that improvements experienced by acquired 
plants as a result of a foreign acquisition continue in the third and fourth year after the 
acquisition. By the end of the fourth year, the productivity gap between the acquired and the 
control plants widens to 40 percentage points. As extending the time horizon limits the size 
of the sample, in the remainder of the study we will focus on the time horizon considered 
originally. 
   16 
Table 4. Matching Results - Longer Horizon 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Log TFP  Log TFP  























Four years later    0.327
*** 
(0.11) 
n  152  108 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
It is worth pointing out that the observed effects of foreign ownership are driven by an 
improved performance of the acquired plants rather than by a deterioration in the situation of 
the control group. If we were to compare to the acquired plants to the average performer in 
the same sector and year (rather than to the c ontrol group), the advantage of foreign 
ownership would appear to be even greater. This suggests that the propensity score matching 
performs well in constructing a suitable control group. 
 
(c) Removing the restriction on matching within sectors 
To ensure that our matching results are not distorted by restricting the control observations to 
come from the same sector and the same time period, below we present the results obtained 
without imposing this constraint. As evident from Table 5, this modification leads to the 
same qualitative conclusions. Allowing out-of-sector matching, however, produces 
somewhat smaller effects. The estimated productivity advantage is almost identical 
regardless of whether the absolute TFP measure or the TFP relative to the industry average 
in a given year is considered.
29 
 
Table 5. Matching Results for Productivity, not restricted within sector/year 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Relative TFP  Log TFP  


















N  213  213 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(d) Accounting for productivity trends prior to acquisition 
The difference-in-differences approach removes plant-specific time-invariant effects, 
however, unobservable but not time-invariant plant-specific characteristics still may pose a 
main challenge in the analysis. While in some subfields of development economics this issue 
                                                 
29 Note that in this case it makes sense to consider both absolute and relative TFP measures because sectoral 
averages do not cancel out as the treated and the control observations may belong to different sectors.   17 
is addressed by the use of randomized experiments, this is unfortunately not an option in our 
context.  
 
As a step toward addressing this issue, we account for pre-acquisition trends in plant 
performance in the matching stage. We construct a new control group based on a new 
propensity score including the productivity change in the period preceding the acquisition in 
addition to the productivity level and all other variables used in Table 2.
30 This requires one 
additional observation per plant and thus reduces the sample size. The difference-in-
differences approach applied to the newly created matched sample produces no statistically 
significant divergence between the treated and the control group in the year when FDI is 
received.  A statistically significant difference is found, however, in the first and the second 
year following the acquisition (see Table 6). Thus this robustness check supports our 
conclusion that FDI recipients outperform plants remaining in domestic hands. 
 
The effects found in Table 6 are smaller than those obtained earlier, amounting to a 22 
percentage-point difference within three years as opposed to a 34-percentage-point 
divergence. The difference in magnitudes, however, appears to be driven by the fact that for 
many acquired plants we do not observe productivity two years before the acquisition and 
are thus unable to include them in this robustness check. When we reproduce the results of 
Table 3 restricting the sample to the 99 plants for which such information is available (see 
column 2 in Table 6), the estimated effects closely resemble those presented in the first 
column of Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Sample Matched on Lagged TFP Growth 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition 
Log TFP 
(matched on lagged TFP growth) 
Log TFP 
(matching corresponding to Table 3) 
















n  99  99 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(e) Evidence of restructuring 
If our findings of improved productivity are due to FDI, we would expect to observe foreign 
owners introduce other changes to plant operations. Indeed we find evidence that acquired 
plants undergo a restructuring process. As illustrated in Table 7, acquired plants grow much 
faster between the pre- and the post-acquisition period than the control establishments, 
implying that foreign ownership helps them increase their output and employment. Further, 
                                                 
30 The productivity change is calculated as the first difference of log TFP in the pre-acquisition period while the 
level refers to the log of TFP relative to the sector/year average in that same year. The latter normalization is done 
in order to assure comparability (recall that TFP estimates come from regressions performed at the sectoral level). 
Neither the productivity change nor the productivity level, however, appear to be statistically significant in the 
probit model.   18 
the acquired plants increase employee wages faster than the control group.
31 In addition, 
plants receiving FDI see a larger rise in their investment outlays relative to establishments 
remaining in domestic hands. All of the mentioned effects are statistically significant 
throughout the period considered. They are also consistent with the anecdotal evidence 
mentioned in the introduction. 
 
Table 7. Matching Results for Output, Employment, Wages, Investment 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Log Output  Log Employment  Log Wages  Log Investment 




































n  185  185  185  185 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
The results also indicate that foreign ownership affects participation of the acquired plants in 
international markets. As illustrated in Table 8, a foreign acquisition leads to an increase the 
share of output exported by 11 percentage points in the year of acquisition and by an 
additional 3 percentage points in the following year.
32 A similar pattern is observed with 
respect to the reliance on imported inputs. In the acquisition year, treated plants increase the 
share of imported inputs by 8 percentage points more than the control group. Two years later 
this difference increases to 12.7 percentage points. Increased reliance on imported 
intermediates and the ability to enter or expand the presence in foreign markets also suggest 
that profound changes to the production process may be taking place in the acquired plants. 
 
Table 8. Matching Results for Export Ratio and Ratio of Imported Inputs 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Exports/Sales  Imported 
Inputs/Inputs 


















n  133  185 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
To sum up, we observe significant changes in the way that plants are managed once they 
receive FDI. The foreign acquisition seems to unleash an acquired plant’s growth potential 
both in terms of productivity and size. The improvements materialize quickly and continue 
                                                 
31 This is to be expected as the existing literature has documented that foreign establishments tend to pay higher 
wages than domestic plants. See Sjoholm and Lipsey (2004) for a careful analysis of the Indonesian case.  
32 This increase in the average export share is a result of both increased export intensity of previously exporting 
plants and of plants entering foreign markets for the first time after the acquisition. The reduction in the sample 
size is due to the unavailability of information on exports in the Census data before 1990.   19 
over time. Acquisitions also raise investment and wages and intensify the plants’ 
participation in the global economy. 
 
 
8. Addressing Alternative Explanations 
As argued earlier, the fact that multinational corporations are characterized by  large 
endowments of intangible assets, high productivity and a willingness to invest in staff 
training suggests that the observed productivity improvements associated with foreign 
acquisitions are likely to result from the introduction of new technologies and management 
techniques and restructuring of plant operations. There exist, however, other explanations 
which could potentially be consistent with the observed productivity improvements. In this 
section we explore their plausibility. 
 
(a) Can the results be explained by valuation? 
A valuation effect stemming, for instance, from a change in accounting procedures or from 
an introduction of a brand name, is not a likely explanation for the observed patterns. First, 
such an effect would lead to a one-time jump in the observed productivity. This is clearly not 
the case in our sample as we observe a sustained productivity growth over a three-year 
period. Second, a mere valuation effect would not explain changes in other aspects of plant 
operations, such as employment, participation in the global economy and so on. Third, it is 
difficult to argue that our findings are purely due to the introduction of a parent company’s 
brand name without any changes being made to the products to which the trademark is then 
applied. In most cases, the fear of a brand-name erosion would make foreign owners hesitant 
to apply their trademark to a product unless they are absolutely sure that the company-wide 
quality standards have been met. Further, royalty payments for the use of the parent 
company’s brand name would be reflected in the company’s accounts. Yet, the results from 
the difference-in-differences approach suggest that the acquired plants do not diverge from 
the control group in terms of royalty payments made (see Table 9).  
 
Table 9. Matching Results for Royalty Payments 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Royalty Payments  
Acquisition year  0.308 
(0.58) 
One year later  1.286
* 
(0.71) 
Two years later   1.195 
(0.74) 
n  60 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Fourth, while transfer pricing could potentially influence our findings, we believe that this is 
an unlikely explanation. Accounting statements in Indonesia are prepared according to well-
established accounting standards, which are directly based on the U.S. Generally Accepted   20 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Asian Development Bank 2003, p.97). This suggests that 
the quality of accounting is reasonably high, particularly in a developing country context. 
The degree to which transfer pricing motives can introduce measurement errors is limited by 
these accounting standards. In any event, the incentives for transfer pricing are probably 
small, because corporate taxes in Indonesia are not much different from those in OECD 
countries.
33 Nevertheless, to rule out transfer pricing as the underlying reason for our 
findings, we limit our sample to acquired plants which do not report any transactions that 
could be used as a vehicle for transfer pricing (i.e., imports, exports or royalty payments). As 
reflected in Table 10 below, our earlier conclusions are confirmed even with the restricted 
sample size. The results suggests that even plants that do not engage in any foreign 
transactions experience a large and statistically significant productivity improvement 
(relative to the control group) following a foreign acquisition. 
 
Table 10. Matching Results for Subsample of Plants with no Foreign Transactions 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Log TFP  
(No foreign trade in t=0 and t=1) 
Log TFP  
(No foreign trade in t=0 to 
t=2)  
Log TFP  
(No foreign trade and no 
royalties in t=0 to t=2) 

























n  25  21  16 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(b) Could the observed changes be due to foreign acquisitions lessening credit constraints? 
While the transfer of know-how and technology accompanied by improvements in 
management is a plausible explanation for the results presented so far, benefits from foreign 
ownership could also work through easier access to financing. It is possible that foreign 
investors pick plants that would have done well in the absence of foreign ownership, had 
they had sufficient access to credit. For instance, foreigners may choose to invest in local 
plants that have recently developed a potentially successful new product or identified a 
promising investment opportunity but are unable to take advantage of it due to lack of 
financing. If this were the case, the sole impact of foreign investment would be provision of 
financing rather than transfer of knowledge. To address this possibility we accounted in the 
construction of the propensity score for having a bank loan  as well for investment 
undertaken by the plant during the year preceding a foreign acquisition (see Table 2). Our 
matching analysis is thus conditional on these two variables. Neither of the two factors, 
however, appears to be a statistically significant predictor of a foreign acquisition. 
 
                                                 
33 This conclusion is based on the corporate tax rates reported in the Global Competitiveness Report (1996). The 
comparison takes into account statutory tax rates as we have no information about tax incentives that may have 
been granted on a case-by-case basis.    21 
To take this issue even further, we employ an alternative matching technique where we 
match plants on a Mahalanobis distance measure of the propensity score and the value of 
investment in the year of ownership change. This allows us to construct a new control group 
with the following characteristics: (i) similarity to the treament group in terms of observable 
characteristics (considered earlier) prior to the acquisition, and (ii) similarity in terms of 
investment undertaken in the year when foreign investment is received. The logic behind this 
exercise is that if plants from the same industry with similar observable characteristics 
exhibit a similar investment pattern in the same year, something other than credit constraints 
should be responsible for a divergence in performance. The results from the difference-in-
differences approach applied to this new control group are presented in Table 11. They are 
very similar to those obtained earlier which suggests that credit constraints are unlikely to be 
driving our results. 
 
Table 11. Matching on Mahalanobis Distance including Investment at t=0 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Log Relative TFP  Log TFP  


















n  152  108 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Finally, we check whether the acquired plants experienced a larger increase in the amount of 
outstanding loans than the control group. This does not appear to be the case. When we 
consider the value of outstanding loans (both domestic and foreign) normalized by the plant 




Table 12. Matching Results for Loans/Sales 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Loans/Sales  
Acquisition year  -0.055 
(0.07) 
One year later  -0.042 
(0.08) 
Two years later   -0.038 
(0.08) 
n  179 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1% level, respectively. 
(c) Can capacity utilization explain the observed productivity improvements? 
In order to ascertain whether the changes taking place in the acquired plants are part of a 
long-term restructuring process, or whether they are short-term expansions of the production 
scale resulting from the provision of new markets, we also apply the matching analysis to the 
                                                 
34 To remove outliers, we drop plants with the loan to output ratio above 10.   22 
self-reported information on capacity utilization. As evident from Table 13 below, changes 
in capacity utilization alone cannot explain the improvements in performance experienced by 
plants receiving FDI. In the year of acquisition, there is no statistically significant divergence 
in capacity utilization between the two groups. In the subsequent year, FDI recipients 
increase their capacity utilization relative to the control group, but two years a fter the 
acquisition the difference disappears. Even in the period where the effect is significant at the 
10 percent level, however, the average increase in capacity utilization amounts to only 8 
percentage points, from 65 to 73 percent.  
 
Table 13. Matching Results for Capacity Utilization 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Capacity Utilization (%)  
Acquisition year  4.32 
(4.62) 
One year later  9.89
* 
(5.35) 
Two years later   8.12 
(5.50) 
n  133 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Neither are our findings due solely to scale economies. The production functions estimated 
at the sectoral level indicate that in 77 percent of cases (or 48 out of 62 sectors) constant 
returns to scale cannot be rejected. Thus, we conclude that the results are consistent with 
foreign investors inducing deep structural changes in the way the acquired plants are run and 
cannot be explained by economies of scale.
35  
 
(d) Are we picking up the exporter effect? 
Our results could potentially reflect the improvements stemming from a plant’s effort to 
prepare for entering export markets, rather than the effect of FDI. To eliminate this 
possibility, we restrict our a ttention to the acquired plants that do not export in the 
acquisition year or the following years. Then we compare the performance of this subsample 
to the corresponding control plants in the same manner as we did before. This modification 
results in a very small change to the magnitude of the effect. As before, in all periods 
considered FDI recipients outperform plants remaining under domestic ownership (see Table 
14). 
 
                                                 
35 Little is known about the relationship between plant-level scale economies and multinationality. The available 
evidence suggests, however, a negative association (see references in Markusen 1995).   23 
Table 14. Matching Results for the Subsample of Plants with no Exports 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Log TFP 
Acquisition year  0.164
** 
(0.08) 
One year later  0.239
*** 
(0.08) 
Two years later   0.295
*** 
(0.10) 
n  102 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (e) Is it foreign ownership per se or acquisitions in general? 
While our data set does not allow us to test directly whether the observed productivity 
improvements stem from foreign ownership  per se or would result from any (domestic or 
foreign) acquisition, we believe that the former explanation is much more plausible for 
several reasons. First, as explained earlier in the literature review, multinational corporations 
are characterized by large endowments of intangible assets relative to other firms in 
developed and, even more so, developing countries. Thus foreign acquisitions present a 
greater potential for technology and know-how transfer to the acquired plants than domestic 
takeovers.  
 
Second, domestic M&A activities in Indonesia were quite limited during the time period 
considered in our study. According to the Securities Data Corporation Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database, there were only 47 domestic acquisitions between 1988 (the first year 
of data availability) and 1994, of which only 19 took place in manufacturing sectors.  
 
Third, as illustrated in the Appendix, the few cases of cases of domestic M&As in 
manufacturing, for which data are available, suggest that foreign acquisitions may be 
associated with g reater performance improvements than domestic takeovers. This view is 
also supported by the evidence from Malaysia presented by Fauzias and Shamsubaridah 
(1995) who find a statistically significant decline in the performance (measured in terms of 
earnings per share and return to capital) of establishments acquired by domestic companies. 
 
Further evidence on the differential effect of domestic and foreign acquisitions comes from 
information on privatization episodes. Our data set does not allow us to identify changes in 
ownership if both the new and old owners are private Indonesian entities. However, we can 
observe previously state-owned plants being sold to domestic or foreign owners. We use this 
fact to compare the performance of formerly state-owned plants that were sold to foreign 
owners (treatment group) with that of plants sold to domestic interests (control group). Again 
the difference-in-differences approach is used. To create the control group we model the 
probability of a state-owned plant being privatized into foreign rather than domestic plants. 
Privatization is defined as a change leading to the public (central and/or local government) 
ownership share dropping to less than 20 percent. The explanatory variables in the probit 
model are the same as those listed in Table 2 with the exception of the public ownership   24 
dummy. As illustrated in Table 15 below, we find that previously state-owned plants 
acquired by foreign investors outperform those sold to domestic interests. The divergence in 
performance i s statistically significant in the first and second year following the 
privatization. In the second year, the estimated advantage is equal to 35 percentage points 
which is only one percentage point higher than the effect estimated in our basic specification 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 15. Matching Results for Privatization Cases  
             (not restricted within sector/year) 
From Public to Foreign Private vs. Domestic Private 
Effect of Foreign Acquisition  Log Relative TFP  
Acquisition year  0.241 
(0.16) 
One year later  0.392
** 
(0.17) 
Two years later   0.303
** 
(0.146) 
n  39 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. Bootstrapped std errors in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(f) Are our results driven by the methodology chosen? 
To eliminate the possibility that our results are driven by the methodology chosen, we use an 
approach employed by several existing studies (Griffith 1999; Harris 2002; Benfratello and 
Sembenelli 2002). We apply a GMM system estimator, proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1999), to estimate a production function including a binary variable for foreign ownership. 
The production function is estimated separately for 62 industries of the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector. If foreign ownership has a positive impact on plant productivity, we 
expect to find a positive coefficient on the FDI variable.  
 
The definitions of variables used in the estimation are the same as those employed earlier, 
except for the additional FDI dummy. Real output i s the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables include production labor, non-production labor, materials and capital 
as well as the FDI dummy. All variables on the right hand side (including FDI) are 
considered potentially endogenous and are instrumented by levels lagged 3 to 6 periods in 
the differenced equation and by differences lagged 2 to 6 periods in the levels equation. 
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Table 16. GMM System Results (Blundell/Bond 1999): 
FDI Indicator in Production Function 
Number of industries with FDI  62 
Industries with positive sign for FDI  55 
Industries with positive sign for FDI, significant at 10% level  39 
Industries with Sargan-Test not rejected at 5% level  44 
Industries with Second-Order Autocorrelation rejected at 5% level  55 
   
Number of FDI Recipients  185 
Number of FDI Recipients in Industries with positive and significant sign for FDI  149 
   
Average magnitude of the estimated effect of FDI on plant productivity  26 % pts  
   
Overall Number of Observations in Estimation  99,964 
 
A summary of the GMM results is presented in Table 16. The coefficient on the FDI variable 
shows a positive sign in 55 of the 62 industries. 73 percent of the acquired plants analyzed in 
Section 7 belong to industries where this effect is positive and significant at the 10 percent 
level. The estimated magnitude of the effect on the plant productivity averages at around 26 
percentage points with the median effect of 23 percentage points. These estimates are 
broadly in line with the results presented in Section 7. The GMM results hence confirm our 




A large empirical literature searches for the evidence of knowledge spillovers from foreign 
direct investment. Implicit to this analysis lies the assumption that foreign ownership per se 
conveys some intangible advantages whose proximity can be beneficial to domestic firms. 
Yet there is no robust empirical confirmation that this assumption holds. 
 
This study fills this gap  in the literature by examining the causal relationship between 
foreign ownership and plant productivity using a Census of Indonesian Manufacturing 
Plants. Our aim is to distinguish between the possibility of foreign investors acquiring 
above-average performers (the gifted kids explanations) and genuine performance 
improvements resulting from foreign ownership (the pushy parent hypothesis). To make a 
clear distinction between correlation and causality, our analysis focuses on plants that change 
from domestic to foreign ownership and combines the difference-in-differences approach 
with a propensity score matching. 
 
The results suggest that foreign ownership brings significant benefits to Indonesian plants. 
The acquired plants experience a faster growth in total factor productivity than their 
counterparts remaining in domestic hands. They also grow faster in terms of output and 
employment, invest more and increase employee wages faster. Finally, they become more   26 
integrated into the international economy, both in terms of exports and in terms of sourcing 
inputs from abroad. 
 
Many developing countries strive to attract FDI inflows in the hope of stimulating economic 
growth through knowledge transfer associated with foreign investment. Recently, the 
Economist magazine pushed this view even further by stating that “the fate of the 
[Indonesian] economy rests on attracting foreign investment.”
36 The positive view of FDI 
and benefits it may bring to Indonesia and other developing countries are reinforced by the 
results of this study which indicate that foreign investors outperform indigenous plants and 
that foreign ownership per se lies at the root of this advantage. This finding is important as 
the existence of a positive direct effect is a precondition for knowledge spillovers from FDI.  
                                                 
36 “Time to deliver: A survey of Indonesia.” December 11, 2004, p. 4.   27 
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Appendix 
Additional Evidence on Domestic vs. Foreign Acquisitions in Indonesia 
The Securities Data Corporation Mergers and Acquisitions Database  lists 47 domestic 
acquisitions in Indonesia between 1988 (the first year of data availability) and 1994 (the last 
year in which acquisitions are considered in our sample), of which 19 took place in 
manufacturing sectors. For 6 of the 19 cases we managed to obtain additional data from the 
Worldscope database (1995 release). As Worldscope does not contain sufficient information 
to calculate TFP figures, in the table below we consider the evolution of the ratio of cost of 
goods sold (COGS) to sales, which gives some indication of the efficiency with which inputs 
are being utilized. The COGS is defined as the wage and material costs. The ratio of COGS 
to sales is normalized by the average value observed in a given industry and year. The 
industry averages are calculated based on the data from the Indonesian Census of 
Manufacturing. For comparison purposes, we calculate the analogous figures for the plants 
acquired by foreign investors, considered in Section 7. 
 
The available information, albeit limited, suggests t hat foreign acquisitions may be 
associated with greater performance improvements than domestic takeovers. A performance 
improvement is defined as a decrease in the ratio of COGS to sales (relative to the industry 
average). Out of six firms considered, only two experience a decline in the ratio and the 
decline does not take place until two year after the acquisition. Thus on average a domestic 
acquisition is associated with a deterioration in firm performance. In contrast, plants which 
undergo foreign acquisitions (considered in Section 7) experience on average a decline in the 
ratio in the year of the acquisition as well as in the following period. Two years after the 
takeover the ratio increases slightly but remains well below the pre-acquisition period. 
 
Table 1A. Cost of Goods Sold over Sales, normalized by the industry average 
  t-1  t=0  t+1  t+2 
Domestic Acquisition 1  0.593  0.912  1.214  1.269 
Domestic Acquisition 2  1.153  1.149  1.176  1.116 
Domestic Acquisition 3  1.062  1.026  1.087  1.102 
Average of 1- 3  0.936  1.029  1.159  1.162 
Domestic Acquisition 4    0.561  0.726  0.833 
Domestic Acquisition 5    0.811  0.961  0.924 
Domestic Acquisition 6    0.736  0.974  1.068 
Average of 4 - 6    0.703  0.887  0.942 
   Overall average (1 – 6)    0.866  1.023  1.052 
   Foreign Acquisitions  0.939  0.925  0.885  0.901 
The figures on domestic acquisition come from the Worldscope database, while the figures for 
foreign acquisitions are from the Indonesian Census of Manufacturing. 
 